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Current Free Speech doctrine does not sufficiently pro-
tect government employees’ First Amendment rights. There 
are two major flaws in the test implemented by the Supreme 
Court in order to find whether the First Amendment protects 
an employee. First, the Garcetti test, where a government 
employee loses First Amendment protection if her speech is 
pursuant to her official duty, is inadequate, overbroad, and 
should be done away with completely – or at the least inter-
preted more narrowly. Secondly, the Pickering balancing 
test is less of a balancing and more of a prioritization of the 
government’s interests and should be interpreted to harmo-
nize both the employee and the government’s interests. 
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“It would be a grave and ironic loss if the emergence of social 
media took us back to 1892 and Justice Holmes’ view that people 
forfeit the First Amendment rights they enjoy in their private lives 
when they go to work for the government.”1 
                                                                                                             
 1 Christopher Dunn, Column: Social Media, Public Employees, and First 
Amendment (New York Law Journal), NYCLU (Apr. 3, 2013), 
http://www.nyclu.org/oped/column-social-media-public-employees-and-first-
amendment-new-york-law-journal. 
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In 1892, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes rendered his decision 
in the case of McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, in which he ex-
pressed his view that the free speech rights of government employ-
ees should be insignificant or nonexistent, namely that the petitioner 
in that case “may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but [had] 
no constitutional right to be a policeman.”2 It was impossible for 
him to predict that social media would revolutionize the way, man-
ner, and audience of public employees’ speech, specifically as it re-
lates to criticism of their employers. The First Amendment was writ-
ten for the purpose of limiting the government’s ability to censor the 
people’s speech and to promote democracy.3 In practice, however, 
the First Amendment acts as a limit on government employees’ 
speech, especially if their speech is expressed through social media. 
Current free speech doctrine does not sufficiently protect gov-
ernment employees’ First Amendment rights.  In order for an em-
ployee’s speech to be protected, it must pass a three part test: 1) the 
speech must not be made by a public employee “pursuant to their 
official duties;”4 2) the speech must be on a matter of “public con-
cern;”5 and 3) the employee’s interest in the speech must outbalance 
the government’s interest in censoring the speech.6  There are two 
major flaws in the test implemented by the Supreme Court in order 
to find whether the First Amendment protects an employee. The first 
part of the test, implemented by Garcetti v. Ceballos, where the gov-
ernment employee loses First Amendment protection if her speech 
is pursuant to her official duty,7 is inadequate, overbroad, and should 
be done away with completely––or at least be interpreted more nar-
rowly. Secondly, the balancing test8 materialized in Pickering v. 
Board of Education, currently gives too much weight to the govern-
ment’s interests and should be interpreted to harmonize both the em-
ployee and the government’s interests.   
                                                                                                             
 2 McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220 (1892). 
 3 Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Press, LINCOLN.EDU, http://www.lin-
coln.edu/criminaljustice/hr/Speech.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2015). 
 4 Jilka, infra note 55. 
 5 Bradley, infra note 64. 
 6 Connick, infra note 72. 
 7 See generally Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 8 See generally Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Tp. High School Dist. 205, Will 
Cnty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
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The case Gresham v. Atlanta is a model illustration of the prob-
lematic application of current free speech doctrine as it is relevant 
to social media.9 In this case, Gresham, a law enforcement officer, 
complained on Facebook about the alleged unethical interference by 
a department investigator in an arrest she had made.10 According to 
the decision, although Gresham’s Facebook page was set to “pri-
vate,” her friends could potentially view her posts and “distribute 
the comment more broadly.”11 Using the Pickering analysis, the 
court reasoned that the plaintiff’s speech was not one calculated to 
bring an issue of public concern to the attention of either her superior 
or the general population, but instead were comments made due to 
personal frustration.12 Additionally, the court added that even if 
there were a stronger public interest in the employee’s speech, the 
balance tilted in favor of the government despite the fact that there 
was no evidence of an actual disruption caused by the speech.13 As 
a result, the content in the plaintiff’s posting was not protected by 
the First Amendment.14 
The problematic effects of current public employee speech doc-
trine stem directly from the improper balancing of free speech val-
ues that gave way to the drafting of the First Amendment in the first 
place. First, current doctrine undermines the value of democratic 
self-governance that is advanced by free speech.15 According to Al-
exander Meiklejohn, “[p]olitical discussion assures that the citizens 
will have the necessary information to make the informed judgments 
(voting) on which a self-governing society is dependent.”16 If gov-
ernment employees cannot criticize their employer freely, whether 
                                                                                                             
 9 See generally Gresham v. Atlanta, 542 Fed App’x 817 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 10 Id. at 818. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 
 13 Id. at 820. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Freedom of Expression, ACLU Briefing Paper Number 10, THE LECTIC 
LAW LIBRARY, http://www.lectlaw.com/files/con01.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 
2015) [hereinafter Freedom of Expression]. 
 16 First Amendment Theories, OKSTATE.EDU, http://media.okstate.edu/fac-
ulty/jsenat/jb3\163/theorists.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2015). 
2016] IS SOCIAL MEDIA THE NEW ERA'S "WATER COOLER"? 967 
	
through social media or other sources, it will prevent whistleblow-
ing, and corruption will be free-flowing.17 In addition, the citizenry 
will not be able to hold government officials accountable for their 
actions or gather enough information to vote and elect their govern-
ment.18 
Furthermore, current doctrine ignores the free speech value of 
the marketplace of ideas.19 This is the “notion that, with minimal 
government intervention—a laissez faire approach to the regulation 
of speech and expression—ideas, theories, propositions, and move-
ments will succeed or fail on their own merits” because individuals 
have the ability to think about diverse propositions in an “open en-
vironment of deliberation and exchange” and ultimately uncover 
truth.20 By silencing most public employee speech, current doctrine 
hinders the progression of ideas––both wrong and right ones.21 As 
Justice Kennedy emphasized in his decision in Ashcroft v. Free 
Speech Coalition, “[t]he right to think is the beginning of freedom, 
and speech must be protected from the government because speech 
is the beginning of thought.”22 This freedom is exactly what is pre-
vented when the marketplace of ideas is curtailed. 
Lastly, by censoring public employee speech, the government is 
interfering with self-expression and personal autonomy.23 The dig-
nity and self-worth of individuals is placed at stake when they are 
prevented from expressing their thoughts, desires, and aspirations.24 
Freedom of expression allows individuals to fulfill their goals as hu-
man beings and should not be subordinate to any other goal––it is a 
                                                                                                             
 17 See J. Michael McGuinness, Whistleblowing and Free Speech: Garcetti’s 
Early Progeny and Shrinking Constitutional Rights of Public Employees, 24 
TOURO L. REV. 529, 540 (2008), http://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/cgi/view-
content.cgi?article=1266&context=lawreview. 
 18 Freedom of Speech (1): Three Rationales, NAHMOD LAW (Jan. 19, 2010, 
11:35 AM), http://nahmodlaw.com/2010/01/19/an-introduction-to-freedom-of-
speech/ [hereinafter Freedom of Speech]. 
 19 See Marketplace of Ideas Theory, U.S. CIVIL LIBERTIES (July 29, 2012, 
3:01 PM), http://uscivilliberties.org/themes/4099-marketplace-of-ideas-theory
.html. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002). 
 23 Freedom of Speech, supra note 18. 
 24 Freedom of Expression, supra note 15. 
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goal in itself.25 Current First Amendment doctrine does not protect 
public employees from retaliation for talking about their concerns, 
issues, or even gripes relating to work with their peers or others on 
social media.26 
So, what is to be done? Current doctrine, particularly the Gar-
cetti test, should be done away with or at least broadened so that all 
speech does not meet a form of “strict in theory, fatal, in fact” fate.27 
In addition, the balancing test should be made into a true balancing 
test rather than a test that gives the government the presumptive ben-
efit of the doubt. 
Part I of this comment will discuss the evolution of social media 
and how it affects and promotes free speech values. Part II will dis-
cuss the current doctrine of First Amendment freedom of speech 
rights as it pertains to governmental employees. Part III argues that 
the Garcetti v. Ceballos test is chilling potentially important speech 
by making its test vague and overbroad, and discusses getting rid of 
this test altogether. Part IV focuses on the Pickering balancing test 
and how it is being wrongly applied to prioritize the interests of em-
ployers and, ultimately, ignore the interests of government employ-
ees and the public. It offers a potential solution by comparing current 
doctrine of public employee speech to that of private employees un-
der the NRLA. Part V will offer some parting thoughts on the reper-
cussions of current free speech doctrine for public employees and 
how the proposed solutions will subdue these repercussions. 
I.   SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE PROMOTION OF FREE SPEECH VALUES 
A.   What is Social Media? 
 “Social media, while susceptible to multiple definitions, can 
best be described as ‘online communications in which individuals 
                                                                                                             
 25 Id. 
 26 See Richard Renner, Retaliation – Public Employees and First Amendment 
Rights, WORKPLACEFAIRNESS.ORG, https://www.workplacefairness.org/retalia-
tion-public-employees#1 (last visited Dec. 28, 2015). 
 27 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S.Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013). 
2016] IS SOCIAL MEDIA THE NEW ERA'S "WATER COOLER"? 969 
	
shift fluidly and flexibly between the role of audience and au-
thor.’”28 Social media encompasses most facets of social network-
ing, in which members create online profiles that they use to “be-
come part of an online community of people with common inter-
ests.”29 Via the Internet, “citizens can publicly speak by posting 
comments, tweets, and ‘likes’ to show their support for people, 
causes, and interests without physically appearing in a public loca-
tion like a school board meeting or a public street.”30 Through status 
updates, “individuals may share and electronically document any as-
pect of life: relationships, emotions, social gatherings, educational 
achievements, life events, and, of course, work.”31    
Social media sites, such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, 
have made the world a more accessible place and provided users 
with a larger audience to spread their message.32 Many of these me-
dia have over 100 million active visitors per month.33 Countless in-
dividuals use these forums to “complain about work and respond to 
colleagues’ complaints.”34 In essence, social media has replaced the 
local bar as the new era’s “water cooler.”35 The difference is, “Fa-
cebook, Twitter and other social media are water coolers with mi-
crophones that can amplify a whisper into a shout that’s rebroadcast 
                                                                                                             
 28 Heather A. Morgan & Felicia A. Davis, Social Media and Employment 




 29 Id. 
 30 Tanya M. Marcum & Sandra J. Perry, When a Public Employer Doesn’t 
Like What Its Employees “Like”: Social Media and the First Amendment, 65 LAB 
L.J. 1, 2 (2014). 
 31 Christina Jaremus, #Firedforfacebook: The Case for Greater Management 
Discretion in Discipline or Discharge for Social Media Activity, 42 RUTGERS L. 
REC. 1, 2 (2014-2015). 
 32 Gregory A. Hearing & Brian C. Ussery, The Times They Are A Changin’: 
The Impact of Technology and Social Media on the Public Workplace, Part I, 86 
FLA. B. J. 35, 1 (2012). 
 33 Ariana C. Green, Using Social Networking to Discuss Work: NLRB Pro-
tection for Derogatory Employee Speech and Concerted Activity, 27 BERKELEY 
TECH L. J. 837, 838 (2012). 
 34 Id.    
 35 Social Media as the New Water Cooler, SFGATE.COM (Jan. 22, 2013), 
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/editorials/article/Social-media-as-the-new-wa-
ter-cooler-4215302.php. 
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in untold directions.”36 If you are an employee who is attempting to 
exercise his First Amendment rights to free speech, social media is 
ideal. It offers a platform for creativity, self-expression, and allows 
those who do not feel comfortable standing in front of an audience 
to share their views through a medium. Most importantly, however, 
social media allows the everyday citizen to share her perceptions 
with a massive audience––a privilege that was previously extended 
only to those with enough power to have access to traditional forms 
of media.37 However, for the employer who would rather avoid crit-
icism or negative public attention caused by employee speech, social 
media can be problematic. 
B.   Social Media’s Effects as the New “Water Cooler” 
Employee online venting and criticizing of their employer on 
social media not only allows the information to be more widespread 
than at the local water cooler, but also causes the speech itself to 
change. First, when one speaks with the computer as an intermedi-
ary, “the activity engaged in and speech made are often much more 
brazen and uninhibited than activity engaged in and speech made 
face-to-face.”38 In addition, everything that is posted is saved in cy-
berspace.39 It is virtually impossible to erase one’s electronic foot-
print “once a posting has gone viral and spread rapidly via the Inter-
net.”40 This is particularly worrisome for employers who are aware 
that “an online posting can create a lingering public record online 
linking a company to the actions of an individual employee,”––even 
worse, it may bring on negative public attention or questions on how 
they conduct their affairs.41 Finally, social media has muddled the 
waters between speech made in an individual capacity and speech 
made in one’s capacity as an employee.42 Because people often use 
                                                                                                             
 36 Id. 
 37 Social Media and Free Speech, The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly, SOCIAL 
MEDIA TODAY (July 29, 2011), http://www.socialmediatoday.com/content/social-
media-and-free-speech-good-bad-and-ugly. 
 38 Jaremus, supra note 31, at 4. 
 39 Id. at 5. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Hearing & Ussery, supra note 32, at 38. 
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one account both to post about their personal life and to gripe about 
their employer, it is difficult to know where the line is drawn. 
C.   Social Media and First Amendment Free Speech Values 
As applicable to government employees, the ability to speak 
about concerns and corruption inside a government entity can be key 
to the democratic self-governance of citizens. Social media has fa-
cilitated communication between the government employee and 
larger audiences on current issues that should concern the citizenry 
at large or, at the very least, her fellow employees.43 This value rep-
resents a “commitment to republican government by allowing . . . 
whistleblowing and other valuable on-the-job speech that facili-
tate[s] the public’s ability to hold the government politically ac-
countable for its choices.”44 And who better to inform the public of 
the internal affairs of the government than someone who witnesses 
its day-to-day dealings and processes? 
Social media promotes the “marketplace of ideas” theory by “ar-
ticulat[ing] substantive ideas and criticisms concerning policies, 
practices, and current events that may be protected [in the work-
place],” and sharing them with their fellow employees, supervisors, 
employers, or even the general public.45 On the other hand, infor-
mation and opinions shared through social media can “be childish, 
crude, immoral, disloyal or just an outlet for thought dreams to be 
seen.”46 Nevertheless, “even the most unpopular idea may contain 
some truth in it and may contribute to the advancement of 
knowledge.”47 
                                                                                                             
 43 Social Media 101, UC SAN DIEGO UNIV. COMMC’NS & PUB. AFFAIRS, 
http://ucpa.ucsd.edu/resources/social/social-101/ (last visited on Feb. 11, 2015). 
 44 Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Con-
trol of its Workers’ Speech to Protect its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 
(2009). 
 45 William A. Herbert, Can’t Escape from the Memory: Social Media and 
Public Sector Labor Law, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 427, 428 (2013). 
 46 Id. 
 47 Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Why Tolerate? Reflections on the Millian Truth 
Principle, 25 PHILOSOPHIA 131, 131–32 (1997), http://www.aca-
demia.edu/1115793/Why_tolerate-reflections_on_Mills_truth_principle (last vis-
ited Dec. 28, 2015). 
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By hindering the unraveling of these values that are promoted 
by social media, free speech is chilled and censorship occurs.48 In 
the context of social media speech, we might always ask ourselves: 
“Is the freedom vast and dangerous?”49 The answer to this will likely 
be yes.50 We might go on to ask “[m]ight we hurt ourselves, and 
others?”51 Again, the answer will be yes.52 But at the end of this 
inquiry, we must not forget that “we might also do some great good, 
might ignite revolutions of hope among the downtrodden and op-
pressed,” and this value will far outweigh any of the negative con-
sequences that the speech might implicate.53 
II.   CURRENT FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE 
Free speech doctrine has had copious breakthroughs since the 
first decision rendered in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford. Nev-
ertheless, current doctrine is far from perfect. In 2006, the United 
States Supreme Court rendered a decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos 
that became the initial question affecting the freedom of speech of 
public employees.54 In Garcetti, Richard Ceballos, a District Attor-
ney in the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office, was in charge of 
supervising other lawyers.55 A defense attorney contacted Ceballos 
with a concern that an affidavit used to obtain a warrant in a pending 
criminal case was faulty.56 After further investigation, Ceballos de-
termined that the affidavit had misrepresentations, and he later 
spoke to a sheriff who was not able to explain the inaccuracies in 
the affidavit.57 As a result, he relayed his findings to his supervisors 
                                                                                                             
 48 Ronald B. Standler, Heckler’s Veto, RBS2 (1999), 
http://www.rbs2.com/heckler.htm. (last visited on Feb. 11, 2015). 
 49 Joy Pullman, Can We Handle Social Media? Yes, If We Can Handle Self-
Government, AEI (May 10, 2011), http://www.aei.org/publication/can-we-han-
dle-social-media-yes-if-we-can-handle-self-government/ 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 See generally Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 55 Michael Jilka, Garcetti v Ceballos and the Altered Landscape of the First 
Amendment Free Speech Claims, 80 J. KAN. B.A. 32, 33 (2011); see also Garcetti, 
547 U.S. at 410. 
 56 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 410. 
 57 Id. 
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and wrote a memorandum in which he requested that the case be 
dropped.58 After a meeting with the sheriff, Ceballos’ supervisors, 
Ceballos, and other employees, Ceballos’ supervisors decided to 
continue the prosecution.59 He was reassigned from his calendar 
deputy position and denied a promotion; he claimed that these were 
retaliation for his memo.60 The Court held that Ceballos was not en-
titled to First Amendment protection for his memo because he had 
written the memo pursuant to his employment duties.61 In other 
words, “the Court formulated a new threshold rule to govern free 
speech claims: ‘we hold that when public employees make state-
ments pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speak-
ing as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution 
does not insulate their communications from employer disci-
pline.’”62 
Ultimately, the Garcetti rule means that a “public employer may 
discipline or discharge an employee for [speech pursuant to official 
duties] regardless of whether the employee’s interest in making the 
speech outweighs management’s interests and regardless of whether 
it was on a matter of public concern.”63 The case of Bradley v. James 
is illustrative of the Garcetti effect. There, a state university police 
officer alleged that his chief was intoxicated and disrupted the in-
vestigation of an incident in a student dormitory.64 The court found 
that the officer’s allegations were made pursuant to his official du-
ties and were therefore not entitled to First Amendment protection.65 
Likewise, in Green v. Barrett, the Eleventh Circuit held that a prison 
guard’s First Amendment rights were not protected when he re-
ported a possible breach of prison security to an assistant superin-
tendent as part of her official responsibilities.66 The test is absolute, 
affording zero protection to those employees whose speech is “pur-
suant to their duties,” and giving little to no exceptions, even when 
the speech could be in the public interest. 
                                                                                                             
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Jilka, supra note 55, at 33; see also Garcetti , 547 U.S. at 410. 
 61 Garcetti , 547 U.S. at 410. 
 62 Jilka, supra note 55, at 33; see also Garcetti , 547 U.S. at 410. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Bradley v. James, 420 F. Supp. 2d 974, 975 (E.D. Ark. 2006). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Green v. Barrett, 226 F. App’x 883, 886 (11th Cir. 2007). 
974 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:963 
	
If the speech in question overcomes the Garcetti hurdle and 
passes on to the second facet of the doctrine’s test, the court turns to 
Pickering.67 If the employee’s speech is not pursuant to an official 
duty, the next step of the inquiry is whether it is on a matter of a 
public concern.68 If the speech is not on a matter of public concern, 
it is not protected.69 In order to be a matter of public concern, a post-
ing must be about a political or social subject or, at the very least, 
concerning a matter that spikes the interest of the general public.70 
For purposes of the Pickering test, it is irrelevant whether the post 
was controversial in nature or was made in private.71 For example, 
the Court held in Connick v. Meyers that matters affecting personal 
concerns in a questionnaire distributed to employees throughout an 
office were not protected by the First Amendment.72 In that case, 
Sheila Meyers, an assistant District Attorney for Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana, was transferred to a different department, which she had 
resisted in private conversations with her superior and the chief dis-
trict attorney.73 As a result, she distributed a questionnaire to her 
fellow employees asking their opinion on her superior’s manage-
ment practices.74 The Court found that most questions on the ques-
tionnaire were not on any matters of “public concern”; rather, they 
were “questions pertaining to the confidence and trust that Myers’ 
co-workers possess in various supervisors, the level of office mo-
rale, and the need for a grievance committee as mere extensions of 
Myers’ dispute over her transfer to another section of the criminal 
court.”75 As a result, her First Amendment rights were not violated 
                                                                                                             
 67 Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Tp. High School Dist. 205, Will Cnty., Ill., 
391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 68 Herbert, supra note 45, at 491. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 168 (1983). 
 73 Id. at 140. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 147 (the court did note, however, that a question in Myers’ question-
naire about whether assistant district attorneys “ever feel pressured to work in 
political campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates” did touch on a mat-
ter of public concern). 
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and “a federal court [was] not the appropriate forum in which to re-
view the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency 
allegedly in reaction to the employee’s behavior.”76 
On the other hand, in the case of Mattingly v. Milligan in the 
Eastern District of Arkansas, the plaintiff, Mattingly, succeeded on 
a claim that her First Amendment rights were violated when she was 
terminated, and that her speech was in fact of public concern.77  Mat-
tingly lamented via Facebook status the firing of nine of her co-
workers at the County Clerk’s Office when Milligan, the newly 
elected County Clerk, came into office.78 After Milligan received 
numerous calls at his home complaining about the firings, he termi-
nated Mattingly for the Facebook post.79 The Court, analyzing the 
case under the Pickering layer of the doctrine, held that the plain-
tiff’s Facebook post was on a matter of public concern, and, as such, 
was entitled First Amendment protection.80 According to the Court, 
unlike in Connick, not only had the plaintiff criticized a public offi-
cial in his capacity as a government employee, but the local media 
had covered the election, and concerned citizens had contacted Mil-
ligan about the firings.81 
Finally, even if the Court finds that the employee spoke as a cit-
izen, not as an employee, and spoke on a matter of public concern, 
she must surpass yet another barricade. The third step is to balance 
the interests of allowing the employee to speak out on such issues 
                                                                                                             
 76 Id. 
 77 Mattingly v. Milligan, No. 4:11CV00215 JLH, 2011 WL 5184283, *6 
(E.D. Ark. Nov. 1, 2011). 
 78 Id. at *2. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id.; Employee’s Facebook Posts Protected by First Amendment, 
DELAWARE EMPLOYMENT LAW BLOG, http://www.delawareemploymentlaw-
blog.com/employees-facebook-posts-protected-by-first-amendment.html (last 
visited on Feb. 11, 2015) (Curiously, the Court avoided the Garcetti question al-
together: whether the speech was made pursuant to Mattingly’s duties as an em-
ployee. It is likely that if this question had been considered, Mattingly’s speech 
would not have been protected by the First Amendment because “employee staff-
ing and other, similar personnel decisions are usually considered internal, opera-
tional issues and speech about such issues are commonly found to be employee 
speech”). 
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against “the government’s interest in the effective and efficient ful-
fillment of its responsibilities to the public.”82 Among the govern-
ment’s interests are “avoiding disruptions in regular operations, dis-
harmony among co-workers, erosion of close working relationships 
requiring personal loyalty and confidentiality, impairment of disci-
pline and supervisory control, and obstructions.”83 To illustrate, this 
vague and subjective third step was applied in Fales v. Garst––the 
Eighth Circuit held that although the education of special needs stu-
dents is clearly a matter of public concern, a principal may lawfully 
discharge teachers for disobeying an order to cease talking about the 
subject.84 The reasoning behind stripping this teacher of her First 
Amendment right to free speech was that the speech “resulted in 
school factions and disharmony among their co-workers and nega-
tively impacted [the principal’s] interest in efficiently administering 
the middle school.”85 
This disconcerting free speech doctrine raises the question: 
What would happen if Pickering was decided under current doctrine 
and in the context of social media? Particularly, what would the 
Court decide in a case of a high school teacher who wrote a post on 
a local newspaper’s Facebook page criticizing how the Board of Ed-
ucation and the District Superintendent handled past proposals to 
raise new revenue for the schools? Realistically, were this issue to 
reach the Supreme Court, the teacher’s speech would likely be pro-
tected––but not for the clarity of the doctrine or its impeccable fair-
ness. Rather, because the facts are strikingly similar to Pickering, 
and the Court would want to maintain their legitimacy through stare 
decisis. The doctrine itself, however, when applied to any other in-
stance but Pickering, muddles the waters of free speech and makes 
it difficult to predict what is and is not protected by the First Amend-
ment. The two particular areas of the doctrine that have shown to be 
the most precarious are the Garcetti test and the Pickering balancing 
test. 
                                                                                                             
 82 Herbert, supra note 43, at 493. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Fales v. Garst, 235 F.3d 1122, 1123 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 85 Id. 
2016] IS SOCIAL MEDIA THE NEW ERA'S "WATER COOLER"? 977 
	
III. THE GARCETTI TEST CHILLS SPEECH WHILE THE COURT 
INTERPRETS IT SO BROADLY THAT IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO 
OVERCOME. 
A.   The Scope of Garcetti 
The Garcetti decision has “increasingly permit[ted] [the] gov-
ernment to control its employees’ expression at work, characterizing 
this speech as the government’s own that it has paid with a salary.”86 
As a result of Garcetti, “most lawsuits brought by public employees 
contending that they were retaliated by their employers for their ex-
ercise of free speech have been won by the public employers.”87 In 
fact, lower courts have been granting summary judgment “in favor 
of employers at an unprecedented rate.”88 This means that if a public 
employee states her thoughts and opinions while at work, and her 
employer does not approve of these thoughts or opinions, she will 
probably be fired despite the “public interest” requirement and the 
Pickering balancing test. In most instances the Court does not even 
reach the question of whether speech is on a matter of public inter-
est; the First Amendment would most likely not protect her. 
For example, in Nixon v. City of Houston, a police officer criti-
cized his department through media outlets while on duty and in his 
uniform.89 The court found that the “officer’s statements lacked a 
constitutional safeguard because they were made ‘pursuant to his 
official duties and during the course of performing his job.’”90 While 
Nixon does seem like a case that could have been decided either way, 
the scope of the ruling in Garcetti has much more far-reaching ef-
fects in its application. 
In essence, the Court has decided that in spite of a public em-
ployee performing her “duties” efficiently, she is subject to being 
stripped of her First Amendment protections and exposed to an ad-
verse employment action by the government. In a Seventh Circuit 
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case, guards who protested against the mistreatment of prisoners 
were stripped of their First Amendment protections because their 
employing prison’s General Orders required the exposure of such 
misconduct, making their speech pursuant to their job duty.91 The 
Tenth Circuit mimicked the previous case by holding that a trans-
plant coordinator who complained about the hospital’s failure to 
reach its level of due care was not protected by the First Amend-
ment, because the hospital that employed her had a policy that in-
structed employees to report instances of unsafe conduct.92 As long 
as the speech can be described as part of the speaker’s job, it will 
receive no protection, regardless of its value. 
Additionally, “although most public employees are not officially 
assigned to engage in work-related social networking, the content of 
posts by employees [on social media] might lack any First Amend-
ment protections.”93 In fact, since Garcetti, most courts have ruled 
that a post related to work duties is unprotected by the First Amend-
ment “regardless of whether it was required by a job description or 
pursuant to an employer’s directive.”94 For instance, in the case of 
Graziosi v. City of Greenville, Officer Graziosi criticized the police 
chief on Facebook for not sending a representative to the funeral of 
a fellow officer who was killed in the line of duty.95 She made these 
posts both on her own Facebook page and on the mayor’s Facebook 
page and was subsequently fired by the police department.96 The 
court held that “it [was] evident that her post could be construed as 
an attack on [the Chief], and the other officers who were in charge 
now compared to the ‘leaders’ of before.”97 In addition, although 
“Graziosi’s posting was not related to any official duty she had as a 
police officer, [it] was made as an employee of the GPD (Greenville 
Police Department) and not a citizen of the Greenville community,” 
and as a result was not protected by the First Amendment.98 It is 
clear then, that if a situation arose where a public employee used her 
                                                                                                             
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Herbert, supra note 45, at 487. 
 94 Id. at 488. 
 95 Graziosi v. City of Greenville, 985 F. Supp. 2d 808, 811 (N.D. Miss. 2013). 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 812. 
2016] IS SOCIAL MEDIA THE NEW ERA'S "WATER COOLER"? 979 
	
personal computer, during non-working hours, to post a grievance 
about a discussion between her and her supervisor where the super-
visor condemned her work habits and failure to provide adequate 
assistance to clients, it very well may not be protected under the First 
Amendment.99 Although this similar situation was protected in His-
panics United in the private context, if applied to the public sphere, 
the employee will likely be discharged without any remedy.100 More 
importantly, considering the wide latitude the courts have given the 
Garcetti test, it would likely be the case that even though this post 
was written during non-working hours on a personal Facebook ac-
count and was generic enough that it did not disseminate infor-
mation that could prove harmful to the government entity, it would 
be considered “pursuant to the employees’ official duties.” The 
courts, with all the deference given to the government, would likely 
hold that even though this employee’s job did not require postings 
of any sort as part of her official duties, since she was speaking about 
the job itself, the substance of the post was “in furtherance of her 
job duties.” 
B.   The Garcetti Test Compromises the Three Free Speech Values: 
Democratic Self-Governance, Self-Autonomy, and the Marketplace 
of Ideas 
1.   DEMOCRATIC SELF-GOVERNANCE 
The Garcetti trend “frustrates a meaningful commitment to re-
publican government.”101 It allows officials to “punish, and thus de-
ter, whistleblowing and other valuable on-the-job speech that would 
otherwise facilitate the public’s ability to hold the government po-
litically accountable for its choices.”102 The Seventh Circuit, for ex-
ample, encountered a case where “police officers were reassigned 
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after informing an assistant district attorney (“ADA”) about allega-
tions that the police chief and deputy chief had harbored an individ-
ual wanted on felony warrants.”103 The court held that the officers’ 
speech was made pursuant to their official duties––specifically, the 
duty to inform the district attorney of any pertinent information re-
lating to the case and, thus, was not protected by the First Amend-
ment.104 As the court emphasized, the officers were performing their 
duties admirably.105 
Nevertheless, “although their demotion for truthfully reporting 
allegations of misconduct may be morally repugnant, after Garcetti 
it does not offend the First Amendment.”106 Correspondingly, the 
Third Circuit concluded, pursuant to Garcetti, that the First Amend-
ment does not  “protect internal reports of health and safety hazards–
–including elevated heavy metals levels––by state troopers and fire-
arms instructors at the state’s shooting range because the reports 
were made pursuant to their official duty to report operational prob-
lems and to maintain a safe worksite.”107 
Garcetti creates a catch twenty-two for public employees.108 By 
speaking per prescribed job duties, an employee is forgoing First 
Amendment protections and may be fired for the speech, and by not 
speaking per prescribed job duties, the employee may be fired for 
simply not performing her job.109 
For example in Garcetti v. Ceballos, Ceballos was fired for a 
memorandum he wrote in support of dropping a case in which a 
warrant was based on a misrepresented affidavit because his speech 
was “pursuant to his job duties.”110 Nevertheless, it is possible that 
if Ceballos did not report this faulty affidavit, and looked the other 
way, that he could have been fired for that too. After all, part of a 
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prosecutor’s job performance requires prosecuting, but also ensur-
ing that justice is achieved, even if that means refraining from pros-
ecution by dismissing a meritless case.111  Nevertheless, because the 
risk is less for not complaining than being a whistleblower, Garcetti 
encourages public employees to look the other way from corruption 
or unethical behavior, “limiting the public’s access to information 
regarding the government’s affairs,” leading back to the problem of 
accountability.112 
The Garcetti rule is defective because, by chilling public em-
ployee speech, it prevents objections from being aired and officials 
from being held accountable, which is imperative in creating excep-
tional leaders.113 “As the public lacks reliable information and de-
liberative forums, citizens are less able to . . . participate in the ex-
pressive aspects of democratic life.”114 Because the First Amend-
ment “is understood to protect the communicative processes neces-
sary to disseminate the information and ideas required for citizens 
to vote in a fully informed and intelligent way,” when speech is sup-
pressed––particularly in a medium as important as social media––
these democratic ideals are marred.115       
2.   SELF-AUTONOMY AND SELF-EXPRESSION 
In addition, “pursuant official duties” that is the staple of Gar-
cetti, is ambiguous and, thus, unpredictable to public employees 
who do not know whether what they say will be protected or not.116 
This is likely to chill speech, as the uncertainty about how broadly 
courts will interpret “pursuant to official duties” will make employ-
ees err on the side of silence. Those who want to avoid losing their 
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jobs are not likely to get involved in any criticism of their employer, 
despite its truth or importance.117 
First, the Court in Garcetti failed to “articulate a ‘comprehensive 
framework’ for defining in future cases what constitutes an employ-
ees’ official duties.”118 In addition, the courts relying on Garcetti 
have refused to rely on the content of job descriptions because of-
tentimes the employee’s job description does not accurately describe 
her day-to-day activities.119 Courts have been given free reign to in-
terpret the test as broadly or narrowly as they decide.120 In Abdur-
Rahman v. Walker, for example, the county’s sewer inspectors ad-
vised their supervisor that the county was complying with state and 
federal laws.121 The inspectors were hired to formulate ordinances 
about the disposal of fat, oil, and grease, and to investigate the cases 
of sewer overflows.122 Nevertheless, the Court held that “all of their 
speech ‘owed its existence to those [official duties],’” despite the 
difference between reports that dealt specifically with sewer flows 
and those that dealt with noncompliance––none of the speech was 
protected by the First Amendment.123 However, the court failed to 
recognize that the inspectors’ investigation was not for the purpose 
of assessing compliance with state and federal law.124 
Some courts have failed to recognize that “actions taken in the 
course of performing job duties are distinct from activities arising 
pursuant to official duties.”125 As a result, the two will be treated as 
one, and all criticism or speech on one’s public employment will be 
silenced.126 The Pickering test will be moot under this regime, as 
those who speak truthfully on a subject converging with their “job 
                                                                                                             
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Keenan, supra note 89, at 873; see also Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 
F.3d 1278, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 122 Abdur-Rahman, 567 F.3d at 1279-80. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 J. Devoy, Garcetti v Ceballos Potentially Subsumes Public Employees’ 
First Amendment Rights, THE LEGAL SATYRICON, https://randazza.word-
press.com/2010/03/30/garcetti-v-ceballos-potentially-subsumes-public-employ-
ees-first-amendment-rights/ (last visited on Feb. 11, 2015). 
 126 Id. 
2016] IS SOCIAL MEDIA THE NEW ERA'S "WATER COOLER"? 983 
	
duties” will never be able to reach it and have the public importance 
of their speech assessed.127 
3.   MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 
Garcetti’s ruling curtails public employee speech overall and in-
terferes with the exchange of ideas between citizens and the uncov-
ering of truth, ultimately affecting the “marketplace of ideas.”128 
Public employees average more than 16 percent of the national 
workforce.129 Because the doctrine does not provide them with a 
space to speak as government employees nor as individuals with re-
spect to their public employee duties, “the vitality of our public dis-
course will suffer.”130 
The Garcetti test is particularly problematic in the arena of pub-
lic employment because government employees are the individuals 
who are in the best position to inform the public of the events, peo-
ple, and decisions of their government, whether these are good or 
bad.131 Public employees have intimate knowledge of the duties they 
perform and there is “an enhanced value in allowing them to con-
tribute to the ‘marketplace’ of ideas by speaking on matters of public 
concern related to their jobs.”132 The Garcetti majority made a gross 
mistake by automatically treating public employee speech made 
pursuant to that worker’s official duties because they “ignored the 
theoretical foundations of government speech as exempt from First 
Amendment scrutiny only because of its instrumental value to the 
public as listeners.”133 As Judge Souter emphasized in his dissenting 
opinion in Garcetti, the fact that Ceballos was a public employee 
did not make his speech less valuable––it made it invaluable.134 
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C.   Overcoming the Great Wall of Garcetti 
The Garcetti rule should be eliminated, with the exception of 
employees who are hired specifically to speak for the government 
agency.135 The government should have authority over the speech of 
“public employees that it has retained to deliver a particular view-
point that is transparently governmental in origin, and, thus open to 
the public’s meaningful credibility and accountability.”136 
For example, the employee in Korb v. Raytheon was not pro-
tected by the First Amendment––and rightfully not so.137 In this 
case, the plaintiff, Korb, joined the executive board of the Commit-
tee for National Security (“CNS”) as a spokesperson.138 The CNS is 
a “nonprofit organization dedicated to informing the public about 
issues of national security and the prevention of nuclear war.”139 At 
a press conference, Korb was critical of increased defense spending 
and urged a scaling back of the 600-ship, 15-carrier group Navy sup-
ported by the Secretary of the Navy.140 The court ruled that: 
. . . the public perception after the press conference 
was that a Raytheon lobbyist advocated a reduction 
in defense spending. Raytheon had a financial stake 
in not advocating that position. Therefore, it deter-
mined that Korb had lost his effectiveness as its 
spokesperson. There is no public policy prohibiting 
an employer from discharging an ineffective at-will 
employee. The fact that Korb’s job duties included 
public speaking does not alter this rule.141 
As a result, the government should be able to fire or discipline 
employees if they are hired “to deliver such a transparently govern-
mental message who carries out her communicative duties in a way 
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that garbles, distorts, contradicts, or otherwise undermines that mes-
sage.”142 
Unlike in Korb, where the plaintiff was hired to spread the mes-
sage that CNS was intending to send to the public,143 other public 
officials should not be assumed to be spokespeople by virtue of their 
position for their speech criticizing their employer. For example, a 
fire chief or police chief should not be terminated for speech uncov-
ering corruption in their agency or department simply because it 
may be inferred that they speak on behalf of that department.144 Alt-
hough police and firefighter chiefs do, in fact, speak on behalf of 
their departments for purposes of their positions, the scope of their 
role is narrow and intended to communicate the basic information 
necessary to inform the public on events and happenings to ensure 
their safety. Unlike the plaintiff in Korb, a public official’s spokes-
person duties should not go as far as transmitting someone else’s 
message to the public. 
IV.   THE PICKERING BALANCING TEST IS BEING WRONGLY APPLIED 
AND TILTS THE FAVOR TOWARDS EMPLOYERS’ INTERESTS. 
A.   When “Balance” Becomes Disproportion: Pickering 
The ideal goal upon which the Pickering balancing test was 
molded was to achieve “a balance between the [public employee], 
as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and in-
terests of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of 
the public services it performs through its employees.”145 Neverthe-
less, this balance is not being achieved.  In fact, when analyzing 
cases under this prong of the free speech doctrine, courts rarely give 
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any deference to the interests of the employee and the public’s in-
terest in hearing that employee speak, relying solely on the interests 
of the government to make their determination.146 
Although Graziosi v. City of Greenville was decided on the Gar-
cetti test, the court went on to analyze the case under the Pickering 
balancing standard.147 The court held that even if Ms. Graziosi did 
speak on a matter of public interest, namely that the Police Chief did 
not send a representative to a fellow officer’s funeral, “Ms. Grazi-
osi’s limited First Amendment interest d[id] not require Chief Can-
non to ‘tolerate action which he reasonably believed would disrupt 
the office, undermine his authority, and destroy close working rela-
tionships.’”148 It should be recognized that “the ability of a police 
department to maintain discipline and good working relationships 
amongst employees is a legitimate governmental interest.”149 Nev-
ertheless, hearing a “buzz” or gossip around the department, as the 
Chief in Graziosi testified, does not rise to the level of destroying 
harmony or working relationships within the department.150 In fact, 
it is inevitable that employees, regardless of the field of work or de-
partment, gossip about events or fellow employees and employ-
ers.151 A mere “buzz” is not a compelling reason to curtail a public 
employee’s First Amendment rights on an issue that was clearly in 
the public interest––otherwise there would have been no “buzz” in 
the first place.152 Not only was the government given deference in 
this respect, but the court never even discussed the interests that 
weighed in favor of Graziosi’s speech––they simply focused on the 
interests that weighed against it.153 Under Grazioci’s interpretation 
of the balancing test, “Internet postings w[ill] be considered pre-
sumptively disruptive to the government’s ability to provide effi-
cient and effective services to the public due to their ability to go 
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viral,” and the balance would be tipped in favor of the government 
even if the speech was made by the employee as a citizen on a matter 
of public interest.154 
Additionally, “if the court finds that the employer reasonably 
believed the speech compromised these goals, the employee’s 
speech is not protected by the First Amendment, and he or she is 
subject to appropriate discipline.”155 “Reasonably believe” is the 
epitome of a subjective test, and, when coupled with the deference 
the court is showing for the government’s interests versus the inter-
ests of the employee, it shows to be disastrous for employees’ free 
speech.156 
B.   Pickering “balancing” is Lethal to Public Employee Speech 
and Makes Free Speech Values Obsolete. 
1.   MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 
By tilting the balance of the Pickering test in favor of the gov-
ernment’s interest, the courts are hindering open and free debate.  
For example, in its decision in Graziosi, the court made clear that 
the speech’s forum was their main concern.157 They stated that “Fa-
cebook, Twitter and the like seem to have a special power to bring 
an issue before the masses, especially when a story goes viral, and 
is on a sensitive subject such as the funeral of a fellow officer.”158 
However, what the court did not take into consideration was that 
their decision has a damaging implication for free speech values.  
Social media embraces the marketplace theory because “it enables 
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virtually anyone to contribute comments, thoughts, and ideas” to a 
particular conversation.159 
Although the court would rather curtail speech that travels too 
far and wide, it does not recognize that this is the ideal situation for 
the marketplace of ideas. The farther the idea spreads, and to the 
most people, the better informed the public will be and the easier it 
will be to find the truth.160 Additionally, social media is the most 
effective and least costly way to distribute information and ideas to 
the masses of people.161 Anybody with an Internet connection can 
register a free account with a social media provider and proceed to 
share her thoughts with the rest of the online universe if she so 
chooses.162 Social media reduces the barriers of who can enter into 
the marketplace of ideas, and where they can enter it.163 The contri-
butions on social media are global––social media knows no borders 
or distances; they result in the most diverse opinions the market 
could possibly offer.164 
Although it could be argued that there are other media through 
which these ideas could be distributed, such as televisions or news-
papers, that argument is ultimately ignoring the high barriers of en-
try. Mass media outlets, in the interest of time, efficiency, cost, and 
ratings are very specific as to what they publish and by whom.165 
Social media knows no such discrimination. 
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2.   DEMOCRATIC SELF-GOVERNANCE AND SUPERIOR 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
Although courts discount “disruption” as a negative thing and 
promote “harmony within the workplace,” “a little disruption can be 
a good thing to uncover corruption and to promote self-autonomy 
and accountability.”166 In Justice Souter’s dissent in Garcetti, he 
emphasized that there is a Congressional Concurrent Resolution that 
recognizes that public employees, despite their employment, main-
tain obligations as U.S. citizens that include “[p]ut[ting] loyalty to 
the highest moral principles and to country above loyalty to persons, 
party, or government department,” and to “[e]xpose corruption 
wherever discovered.”167 Despite this resolution, which was written 
by Congress itself, employees are being punished for complying 
with their civic duty. 
Additionally, giving the government’s interests deference over 
employee’s interest in speech promotes complacency both from the 
employee and the employer. On one hand, the “stream of disappoint-
ments and failed battles” will make employees satisfied with simply 
receiving a paycheck every week and “beat [them] into submission” 
to the point where they no longer complain nor care about the affairs 
of their government entity.168 This creates an atmosphere where em-
ployees are not fulfilled and are not permitted to reach their full po-
tential.169 They will not criticize their employer––not because they 
do not believe that a certain subject is worthy of criticism, but 
“they’ve just been programmed to believe that raising issues is futile 
and therefore they are better off just staying under the radar in every 
way.”170 
On the other hand, supervisors will also become complacent. If 
a supervisor does not have to worry about an employee’s complaints 
or concerns, she will never have to worry about her job either. As a 
result, a domino effect will take place, in which some will perform 
their duties poorly and others might engage in unethical behavior 
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and corruption. Finally, if employers always come out on the win-
ning end of the First Amendment question because all criticism or 
hurtful speech made against them is silenced, it will devalue the pos-
itive reviews that employees may give them because there will be 
no point of comparison. In essence, there will be no negative speech, 
there will either be positive speech or silence. 
In Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments, he argued that the Establishment of a Religion would 
simply “foster in those who still reject [the established religion], a 
suspicion that its friends are too conscious of its fallacies to trust it 
to its own merits.”171 In the same way here, the limiting of critical 
speech against the government undermines the integrity of that en-
tity by making it appear as if it is not legitimate but for the chilling 
of this criticism.172 
3.   SELF-AUTONOMY AND EXPRESSION 
The current interpretation of the Pickering balancing test is left 
to be open, broad, and subjective.173 “Judges exercise substantial, if 
not unfettered, discretion in deciding this question, based on an in-
dividualized evaluation of both the quantity and quality of disrup-
tion.”174 Because there is no clear rule, it is difficult for individuals 
to predict what types of speech might cost them their employment 
and conform their behavior to those standards.175 For example, two 
Tenth Circuit panels had polar opposite interpretations of almost 
identical cases in which police officers displayed signs on their 
yards favoring candidates in local elections.176 While one panel held 
that the sign was not protected by the First Amendment “due to the 
danger that the public would come to doubt the impartiality of the 
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police,” a second panel held that a similar sign was protected be-
cause there was little chance of disruption.177 
This “reasonably disruptive standard” is a slippery slope in 
which all comments can be potentially described as disruptive. Re-
lying on the public’s reaction to an employee’s speech is equivalent 
to permitting a “heckler’s veto,” which the Supreme Court has held 
to be an unconstitutional basis for restricting protected expres-
sion.178 Under this balancing test, the manner or content of the em-
ployee’s speech is irrelevant.179 As long as the public has some sort 
of reaction to the speech, whether it be supporting it or disagreeing 
with it, it is likely that the employee will lose constitutional protec-
tion for this speech.180 If, conversely, the public never learns about 
the speech or, for whatever reason, is not interested in it, the em-
ployee has more of a chance of obtaining First Amendment protec-
tion.181 This defeats the entire purpose of free speech, because even 
if the speech is allowed to be said or posted on social media, it loses 
its intrinsic value if it is not communicated or heard by others. 
While the courts believe that they are protecting the government 
through this interpretation of the balancing test and promoting its 
efficiency by chilling some types of speech, they are doing the exact 
opposite.182 Justice Kennedy’s majority decision in Garcetti “pro-
tects whistleblowers if they go to the press [with their concerns] but 
offers them no such protection if the employee goes directly to their 
supervisor.”183 This makes the government more inefficient and pre-
vents public concerns from being aired up the chain of command.184
   
                                                                                                             
 177 Wells, supra note 145, at 968; Horstkoetter, 159 F.3d at 1272-74; Cragg, 
143 F.3d at 1346-47. 
 178 Mary Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of Off-Duty Government 
Employees, 201 B.Y.U. L. REV. 2117, 2156 (2011); See Edwards v. South Caro-
lina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Kline, supra note 88, at 84. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. 
992 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:963 
	
C.   Solving the Pickering “Balance” Problem 
The government’s and the employee’s interests should be given 
equal weight in the balancing test, rather than the government’s in-
terest receiving priority. The Court’s current interpretation supports 
a subjective “reasonable belief” by an employer that speech by an 
employee would cause disruption or inefficiency as enough to tip 
the balance for the government.185 This interpretation should be 
abolished altogether.186 The latitude given to this deference is unfair 
and overbroad because the employer can manufacture a reasonable 
belief that “the government employees’ speech affects morale in the 
workplace, fosters disharmony, impedes the employees’ own ability 
to perform duties, or obstructs established working relationships” in 
order to fire him.187 
Furthermore, the fact that the speech was expressed through so-
cial media, rather than through another medium, should not make 
the speech presumptively disruptive.188 The test should “protect 
both employer and employee interests, instead of elevating one in-
terest over the other”; this would “further equalize the employment 
relationship” rather than cause a divide between the employees and 
employers.189 
Courts should revert to the old test, created in Pickering, in 
which there must be an actual showing of disruption or inefficiency 
by the employee before the employer can take an adverse employ-
ment action.190 The Pickering requirement of “actual disruption” is 
not a perfect one, as it has a tendency to have a finding of disruption 
by an employee only after the disruption has actually occurred and 
the damage to the government entity is done. However, it is better 
to err on the side of protecting individual’s Constitutional rights, 
both as citizens and employees, than to use a “subjective standard 
                                                                                                             
 185 Id. 
 186 Beyond Garcetti, supra note 155. 
 187 Pujara, supra note 156. 
 188 See Graziosi, 985 F. Supp. 2d at 814. 
 189 Stephanie M. Merabet, The Sword and Shield of Social Networking: Harm-
ing Employers’ Goodwill Through Concerted Facebook Activity, SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 1162, 1186 (2013). 
 190 Id. 
2016] IS SOCIAL MEDIA THE NEW ERA'S "WATER COOLER"? 993 
	
that gives government employers the ability to make subjective de-
cisions based on speculative belief as to the disruptive impact of em-
ployee speech.”191 
Nevertheless, in equalizing the weight of the employees’ inter-
ests in their speech, the courts need to tread lightly. Although em-
ployees’ interests should be taken into account, they should not au-
tomatically outweigh those of the employer on the majority of occa-
sions––the balancing should not go as far as the National Labor Re-
lations Act (“NLRA”) has. 
1.   NLRA’S EXPANSIVE PROTECTION 
The NLRA was enacted by Congress to guarantee basic em-
ployee rights to employees in the private sector.192 Section 7 of the 
NLRA states, “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, 
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in 
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid and protection.” 
As a result, it is illegal for an employer to fire an employee who 
has engaged in Section 7 protected activity.193 
The problem arises in that NLRA cases allow employees to vir-
tually get away with any speech at their employer’s expense. There 
is nothing that employers can do to protect their online reputation 
“from the damaging public comments of irate employees, unless 
such comments are either threatening or outrageously egregious.”194 
But, in practice, they cannot even protect themselves from this. Alt-
hough, “in theory, it may be possible for an employee to lose the 
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protections of the NLRA through necessary disparagement, in prac-
tice, the General Counsel has actually allowed the Facebook com-
ments to go quite far.”195 
For example, photographs of an employer-sponsored sales event 
where an employee made sarcastic comments about the food, calling 
it, among other things, “stale and overcooked,” was not disparaging 
of the employer’s product and did not lose NLRA protection.196 Ad-
ditionally, it has been held that employees who use profane language 
to criticize one of the owners is protected by the NLRA when the 
profanity is intertwined with criticism pertaining to working condi-
tions.197 
In a case in which an employee spoke obscenities of his em-
ployer for not withholding the proper amount of taxes from his 
paychecks, the Board decided that the employee was protected by 
the NLRA.198 Despite the profane words he used, the Board held 
that the purpose of the employee’s conversation was to “seek and 
provide mutual support looking toward group action to encourage 
the employer to address problems in terms and conditions of em-
ployment, not to disparage its product or services or undermine its 
reputation.”199 In fact, the General Counsel has stated that even a 
“Facebook conversation in which an employee called her supervisor 
a ‘dick’ and a ‘scumbag’ did not raise to the level of disparagement 
that would lose protection of the act.”200 
Pursuant to this statement, an employee was protected by the 
NLRA when he called the owner of a company that employed him 
a “F’ing mother F’ing” and “F’ing crook” and an “a_hole,” on social 
                                                                                                             
 195 Megan Marie Kosovich, The NLRA vs. The First Amendment: Which One 
Helps the Employee Who Loves Social Media?, SEATON HALL LAW EREPOSITORY 
(May 1, 2013), http://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1258&
context=student_scholarship. 
 196 Id. at 14. 
 197 Michael Arnold, NLRB Continues Aggressive Crackdown on Social Media 
Policies, EMPLOYMENT MATTERS, (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.employment-
mattersblog.com/2014/09/nlrb-continues-aggressive-crackdown-on-social-me-
dia-policies/. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Robert Sprague, Facebook Meets the NLRB: Employee Online Communi-
cations and Unfair Labor Practices, 14 U. PENN. J. OF BUS. LAW 957, 964 (2012). 
2016] IS SOCIAL MEDIA THE NEW ERA'S "WATER COOLER"? 995 
	
media and added that “the manager was stupid, nobody liked him, 
and everyone talked about him behind his back.”201 
However, if this particular case had occurred in the public 
sphere, it would most surely not have First Amendment protection–
–and, in this case, it should not. The courts would likely hold that 
Garcetti applies because, in light of precedent, comments about su-
pervision concerns can be interpreted to be “pursuant to job duties.” 
Even if it was assumed that Garcetti did not apply, and even if it 
could be argued that these profane comments were in the “public 
interest,” the government’s interest in avoiding disruption and pro-
tecting the efficiency of the government entity would likely out-
weigh the employee’s interest in disparaging his supervisor on so-
cial media. It might even be seen as a defamatory comment, which 
has no free speech value under First Amendment jurisprudence.202 
In this case, however, the courts would be correct. 
Doctrine, whether public or private sector, cannot go as far as to 
allow employees to speak about their employers with blatant disre-
spect and minimize them in the eyes of the public because they are 
not happy with some aspect of their job. The NLRA leaves employ-
ers helpless to defend their legitimate business interest in their good-
will, while simultaneously rendering the NLRA ineffective.203 
While employers have to keep paying the salaries of employees who 
have publicly insulted their business, their hands are tied and resent-
ment towards employees is built.204 All in all, the NLRA ends up 
“embold[ing] bullies––not victims––by protecting disparaging re-
marks as if they contain something of value.”205 
On the other hand, although the NLRA is overbroad, it grants 
some protection to employees that the public sector does not, yet 
should. For example, if a government employee who was demoted 
criticized his supervisor’s decisions on social media, where he is Fa-
cebook friends with his fellow employees, he would be protected by 
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the NLRA, but not the First Amendment. Under a First Amendment 
analysis, even though there are employee interests in obtaining his 
fellow employee’s opinions through the post or in potentially getting 
an unjust demotion overturned by that supervisor’s superiors, it will 
likely not be protected. 
If this issue reached the Court, it would likely hold, under cur-
rent doctrine, that the employee “reasonably believed” that the Fa-
cebook status could cause a disruption, namely that the rest of the 
employees might rise against the employer to prevent their own de-
motion, which they will be sure is imminent. Nevertheless, this same 
scenario under current NLRA law would be protected because it 
would be considered “protected concerted activity” where one em-
ployee is reaching out to other employees for mutual protection re-
garding job conditions. 
In this situation, the NLRA would balance the interests of the 
employee and employer better than current First Amendment doc-
trine would. This is a contradiction in itself. The First Amendment 
was enacted to protect people from their government, and they are 
currently being protected from anybody but. Additionally, disrup-
tion is part of the process of making an injustice just. If, after inves-
tigation, there is a realization that there was no injustice, the post 
still has free speech value because it would have given the public 
another point of view, which they are free to disagree with and is 
consistent with the “marketplace of ideas” theory. In fact, they may 
even side with the supervisor. But no matter who they decide to sup-
port, it gives the employees, or the public for that matter, the ability 
to decide whether they are happy with those representing them in 
this particular government entity (in this case the supervisor) or not. 
If they are not, they have the power to petition for change. This is 
consistent with the ideas of self-democracy and political autonomy. 
V. CONCLUSION 
“As social media gives employees a platform to amplify their 
voice, it simultaneously enlarges the risk of undermining manage-
ment’s right to control its business.”206 In the public sphere, the cur-
rent doctrine’s response to social media’s ability to spread speech is 
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to, ultimately, silence it. Although this will be beneficial to govern-
ment entities by protecting their images and maintaining harmony 
at work, the downfalls reflect not only on the employees, but on all 
American citizens. By upholding this doctrine, we are unintention-
ally discarding all of the free speech values that the Founders had in 
mind when they drafted the First Amendment. To avoid turning the 
free speech of government employees into an old and archaic notion, 
we should broaden the interpretation of the doctrine as a whole. 
However, we should keep in mind that extremes are not efficient 
and avoid going as far as prioritizing employee interests over all 
else, such as has been done under the NLRA. Taking this moderate 
approach will honor Justice Stevens’ answer to the question, “Does 
the First Amendment protect employee speech?,” to which he an-
swered “sometimes”––not “never.”207 
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